 Today
marks 10 years since FDC president, Col (rtd) Dr Kizza Besigye,
formally announced that he would contest for the presidency against his
former boss, President Yoweri Museveni. Besigye made the declaration in
a press release issued on Saturday, October 28, 2000. His move had come
a week after his October 20, 2000 retirement from the Army, and a year
after his November 1999 hard-hitting dossier titled, An Insider’s view of how NRM lost the broad-base for
which he was to be court-martialed until he “regretted” the controversy
it created in a letter to President Museveni. In the highly publicised
document, Besigye accused the Movement of being undemocratic, corrupt,
opportunistic, dishonest and sectarian. He also accused it of reneging
on its core principles of individual merit and being broad-based.
Besigye further said that the Movement had been manipulated by people
seeking to gain or retain political power, and that it was behaving like
a political party contrary to what it professed to be. Ten years later,
it appears only time has changed but not the actors. Besigye is making a
third attempt at dislodging President Museveni from power, having lost
in the 2001 and 2006 elections. Both Museveni and Besigye were nominated
on Monday to contest in the February 2011 elections. Starting today,
The Observer shall run a series of articles on the 10-year struggle for
power between these two men. These must read articles shall examine
issues that have always shaped the Besigye- Museveni contests. In the
first offering, MICHAEL MUBANGIZI traces the origins of Besigye’s disenchantment with the Movement that saw him seek to eject his former comrade.
When did it start?
The source of disagreement between President
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni and his political nemesis Col. (Rtd) Dr. Warren
Kizza Besigye Kifeefe remains a matter of public debate, varying in
opinion, depending on who you talk to. Some say it is personal, driven
by ego and vengeance, while others say it is based on principle. Yet
many others have no clue, wondering how it came to this. They ask: did
it start in 1999 when Besigye, who earlier served in senior positions as
minister and National Political Commissar, wrote a strongly worded
critique of the Movement titled An Insider’s view of how NRM lost the broad-base or
was this document simply the final straw? Did the fall out start when
Besigye’s star in national politics started fading, as some people point
out, or was the fading itself because he had already been marked as a
threat? One of the 38 NRM historicals, Besigye served as Director of
Medical Services in the National Resistance Army –NRA- (1985). He was
later appointed minister of State for Internal Affairs and National
Political Commissar in 1988. Pundits say that thereafter, Besigye’s
standing in the Museveni government started taking a down word-spiral.
In 1991, he was removed from Cabinet and appointed commander of the NRA
Mechanised Regiment in Masaka, and later NRA’s Chief of Logistics and
Engineering (1993-1998). The Colonel’s last office in the NRM was that
of Senior Military Advisor to the Minister of Defence –who was then
President Museveni – in 1998. Besigye’s 1999 dossier, which The Observer
will publish next week, offers insights into how the former political
allies became foes. A review of the document shows that the seeds of
discord were sowed in the early 1990s, matured during the Constituent
Assembly debates (1993-1995) and came to the fore in 1999. In the memo,
Besigye claimed that the Movement had lost its broad-base character in
early 1990’s. He wrote: “The popular concept of the broad-based
government, which had also received support of most political groups,
was progressively undermined.” This is similar to what he told The
Observer about his prison experience I feared being poisoned while in Luzira Prison in The Weekly Observer, February 8-14, 2007.
 Besigye (circled) with other NRA bush war fighters
Losing track?
In the interview, Besigye said the Movement started losing track in
the early 1990s, the time he had planned to retire from the army. “When I
joined the army (NRA), my objective was limited to seeing the removal
of the dictatorship and establishing democratic governance in which each
of us would peacefully thrive. I had therefore hoped to leave the army
by the time of the making of the new constitution in the early 1990s to
do my own things. “But then, that is the time things started going
seriously wrong. We went to the Constituent Assembly (CA); it was
manipulated and really sabotaged by NRM leaders, in fact by
Museveni himself. Things have since that time moved in some kind of
un-controlled manner.” By 1994, Besigye further states in his dossier,
“The NRM’s all encompassing, and broad-based concept remained only in
name.” While the CA electoral law provided for individual merit as the
basis of standing for political office, Besigye said, the NRM
Secretariat set up special committees to recommend NRM candidates for
support during the CA elections. He also took a swipe at the declaration
by some senior NRM leaders that they had won the CA elections, yet
legally all Ugandans were assumed to be part of the Movement. “Who had
won? It was clear there were two systems; one described in the law, and
another being practised.” During the CA deliberations, Besigye, together
with Lt. Col. Serwanga Lwanga (RIP), and Gen. David Tinyefuza, were
among the army officers who opposed the extension of the Movement rule
and supported the return to multi-partyism and federalism. Quoting
minutes of an August 25, 1994 meeting between President Museveni and a
section of CA delegates at the President’s Kisozi farm, Besigye says the
Movement formed a group to represent its positions in CA, yet all
people were assumed to be Movement supporters. “The arbitrarily
handpicked group went ahead to take positions on major areas of the
draft constitution, which we members of CA, considered as “NRM
supporters” were supposed to support in the CA.” Ironically, the
16-member team comprised people like Miria Matembe, Bidandi Ssali and
Justice George Kanyeihamba who have since fallen out with the Movement,
or are critical of President Museveni. Both Matembe and Bidandi were
sacked from Cabinet for opposing attempts to amend the constitution to
lift term limits. Bidandi now heads an opposition political party –
People’s Progressive Party. Eriya Kategaya, who was National Political
Commissar, and attended the meeting, was also eventually sacked from
Cabinet for opposing a third term for President Museveni, only to be
re-appointed later. Others who attended the meeting were Steven Chebrot,
the late Agard Didi, Mathias Ngobi, Michael Sebalu, the late Noble
Mayombo, Jotham Tumwesigye, Aziz Kasujja, Beatrice Lagada, Faith
Mwonda and Margret Zziwa.
Mixed reaction
The Besigye document evoked mixed reactions. While some welcomed it,
others like President Museveni and the army command were enraged. In
fact, there was a threat to court-martial Besigye for making
controversial statements in public while still in active military
service. But local leaders from Besigye’s home area, Rukungiri, opposed
the move, forming forums like the National Task Force Besigye Rescue
Group to intercede for him. They also asked the army to honour Besigye’s
request to retire. Having achieved their objective, many of the leaders
involved in that struggle have since abandoned Besigye. Robert
Ndyomugenyi formed the little-known Reform Party, while former
Kinkiizi West Parliament aspirant, Iddily Kwijuka Baryareba, remains an
NRM activist. Baryareeba was secretary general of the National Task
Force Besigye Rescue Group. “We now know that Besigye may be arrested
anytime…and if anything like that happens, we are planning bigger
action,” said Kwijuka who was also mobilisation secretary of
Rukungiri Development Committee in 2000 Besigye group now plans bigger action; The Monitor, October 20, 2000 Such
statements enraged President Museveni who ordered security agencies to
decisively deal with people threatening violence in the name of
defending Besigye. In a memo to the then minister of State for Defence,
Steven Kavuma, Museveni wrote: “I continue to see newspaper reports
quoting some civilians that are supposed to be defending Col.
Besigye….working with the appropriate organs of the state, warn the
leaders of those groups that they will come to grief if they are to
disrupt public order in the defence of Besigye.” The National Task Force
Besigye Rescue Group, Kwijuka said, believed the army was insincere in
investigating remarks attributed to Besigye during the burial of DP’s
publicity secretary, Anthony Ssekweyama, on October 3, 2000. Besigye had
reportedly stirred controversy during Ssekweyama’s burial at Buwungu,
Mitala Maria, when he told mourners that he stood by what he had written
in his missive. Besigye likened himself to Ssekweyama and asked people
to emulate his (Sekweyama’s) principled, straight forwardness, upright
and resolute character in pursuing what they believe in. These remarks
re-ignited trouble for Besigye. Gen. Jeje Odong, army commander at the
time, noted that although they had begun considering Besigye’s
retirement, his statements at Sekweyama’s burial had taken them back to
square one Col. Besigye in more trouble with the army, Sunday Monitor, October 8, 2000.
Personal agenda?
Commenting on his support for Besigye in 1999/2000 and returning to
the Movement fold, Baryareeba told The Observer that he opposed
Besigye’s trial but didn’t support him politically. “Mine was a cause. I
was saying Besigye shouldn’t be court-martialed because of his views. I
wanted people in NRM to rebut what he had written but not to
court-martial him,” he said. Baryareeba also spoke of the hypocrisy of
some of Besigye’s supporters who he says privately supported him but
never publicly identified with him. He added that he was later to
realise that Besigye’s opposition to Museveni was based on personal ego,
vengeance, anger and pretence. He, for instance, argues that while
Besigye accused Museveni of nepotism and family rule, most of the
former’s campaign teams have been dominated by members of his family. He
cited Besigye’s wife, Winnie Byanyima, her sister Martha and brother,
Anthony, among others. Kwijuka also alleges that Besigye’s political
pursuits are driven by personal interest, citing his decision to ignore
some NRM historicals who suggested that he let Museveni complete his
term after 2001, before challenging him for the presidency. “What was so
much at stake that he had to contest?” Baryareeba asks. Before
announcing that he would stand for the president, Besigye held private
talks with key NRM leaders such as the late James Wapakhabulo,
Jaberi Bidandi Ssali, Eriya Kategaya and Amanya Mushega on the direction
of the Movement. One such meeting took place at the ministry of Public
Service, which was then headed by Mushega. Besigye, however, told The
Observer in an interview about his prison experience that his bid for
the presidency wasn’t driven by personal interest. “Even in 2001, it
wasn’t my intention at all to join politics. My intention was to go into
private life outside government. I had however hoped that some of our
colleagues, in the circumstances, would take over the challenge to
challenge the regime. But as it turned out, they did not consider it the
right time. Many of them said we should wait since Museveni was serving
his last term. But I felt strongly that it was the right time to
challenge him because any day that he continued unchallenged would be
compounding the problem.” It is indeed believed that during one of these
meetings of historical NRM leaders who wanted change, Besigye urged
Jaberi Bidandi Ssali or Kategaya to take on Museveni but they declined,
saying the President was after all going for his last term. Four years
later, the constitution was amended and term limits removed, exonerating
Besigye who had argued that Museveni would not leave. As the amendment
chorus gained momentum at around 2003, disappointed Kategaya and
Bidandi Ssali, among others, tried to resist it, but ended up not only
failing but also losing their cabinet jobs. Another historical, newly
elected NRM chairman for Buganda region and former Luwero district
chairman, Abdu Nadduli, says the current political trends show that
Besigye’s accusations against the Movement in 1999 had no merit. “If he
says that the NRM was corrupt, how come he was not corrupt if he was
part of it?” argues Nadduli. On Besigye’s accusation that the Movement
was undemocratic, Nadduli asks, “If he is democratic, are we the ones
chasing away Beti Kamya and Nabilah Ssempala from his party? Aren’t
people leaving his party accusing it of being undemocratic?”
Nadduli also insists that CA delegates were elected on merit contrary to
Besigye’s claims that they were supported by some special movement
organs.
| News |
| Written by Michael Mubangizi |
| Wednesday, 03 November 2010 19:55 |
|
Page 1 of 2
 Gen Museveni taking oath in 1986
The dossier that got Besigye into trouble
He escaped court martial for engaging in politics In
November 1999, Col. Kizza Besigye, while still a serving Army officer,
authored a document titled, An Insider’s view of how NRM lost the
broad-base, which was very critical of the direction the NRM under
President Museveni was taking. Incensed by the document, the Army
attempted to court martial the author but backed down amid protests that
Besigye’s rights were being violated. In our continuing series on the
10-year-contest for power between Museveni and Besigye, we reproduce a
heavily edited version of that hair-raising missive. I have taken keen
interest and participated in the political activities on the Ugandan
scene since the late 1970s. This was during a period of intense jostling
to topple and later succeed the Idi Amin regime. I am, therefore, fully
aware of the euphoria, excitement and hope with which Ugandans received
the Uganda National Liberation Front/Army (UNLF/A). Ugandans supported
the UNLF’s stated approach of “politics of consensus” through the common
front. It was hoped that the new approach to politics would be
maintained and Uganda rebuilt from the ruins left by the Amin regime.
Unfortunately, instead of nurturing the structures, and regulations
which bound the front together, we witnessed a primitive power struggle
that resulted in ripping the front apart to the chagrin of the
population. Some of us young people were immediately thrown into serious
confusion. We had not belonged to any political party before, and we
did not approve of the record and character of the existing parties –
UPC and DP. Spontaneously, many people started talking of belonging to a
Third Force. This force represented those persons who wished to make a
fresh start at political organization, with unity and consensus politics
as the centre pin. With a few months left to the 1980 elections, the
Third Force crystallized into a new political organization– the Uganda
Patriotic Movement (UPM). The population, to a large extent, expressed
their appreciation of the ideas and opportunity presented by the young
organization, but was pessimistic regarding its electoral success.
Pessimism was justified, because the new organisation simply had no time
and resources to organize effectively nationally; and UPC was already
positioning itself very loudly and arrogantly to rig the elections and
seemed to have what was essential for them to do so successfully. After
the sham 1980 elections, when Paulo Muwanga, a leader of UPC (and
chairman of the Military Commission) took over all powers of the
Electoral Commission and declared his own election results, there was
widespread despondency and tension. While the “minority” DP Members of
Parliament took up the opposition benches in Parliament, the rank and
file of the party rapidly united behind the new forces of resistance to
struggle against the dictatorial rule. The Popular Resistance Army (PRA
and later, NRA) led by Yoweri Museveni which started with about 30
fighters, was overwhelmed by people seeking to join its ranks. The NRM
was born as a political organization in June 1981. It was created by a
protocol that effected the merger of Uganda Freedom Fighters UFF (led by
the late Prof Y.K. Lule and Museveni’s PRA). The armed wing of the
organization became the National Resistance Army (NRA). The NRM
political programme was initially based on seven points which were later
increased to become the well-known Ten-Point Programme. The basic
consideration in drawing up the programme was that it should form the
basis of a broad national political and social force. A national
coalition was considered to be of critical importance in establishing
peace, security, and optimally moving the country forward. The political
programme was, therefore, referred to as a minimum programme around
which different political forces in Uganda could unite for
rehabilitation and recovery of the country. To achieve unity, it was
envisaged that the minimum programme would be implemented by a
broad-based government. After the bush war, discussions were undertaken
with the various political forces to establish a broad-based government
that would reflect a national consensus. The NRM set up a committee led
by Eriya Kategeya (then chairman of the NRM Political and Diplomatic
committee) for the purpose of engaging the various groups in these
discussions. This exercise was, however, never taken to its logical
conclusion. It would appear that once the leaders of the political
parties were given “good” posts in the NRM government, their enthusiasm
for the discussions waned, and the process eventually fizzled out. In
spite of the lack of a proper modus operandi, the initial NRM government
(executive branch) was impressively broad-based. Consensus politics
conducted through elections based on individual merit and formation of
broad-based government became the hallmark of the NRM.
Broad base undermined
However, the popular concept of the broad-based government, which had
also received support of most political groups, was progressively
undermined. It ought to be remembered that due to the support and
cooperation of other political groups, no legal restrictions were
imposed –on political parties until August 11, 1992 when the NRC made a
resolution on political party activities in the interim period. In my
opinion, there were three factors responsible for undermining and later
destroying the NRM cardinal principle of broad-basedness, especially in
appointment to the Executive: The NRM had set itself to serve for a
period of four years as an interim government, then return power to the
people. However, it was not very clear how this would happen at the end
of the four years. Some politicians in NRM government who came from
other political parties set out to use their advantaged positions to, on
the one hand, undermine the NRM and on the other, strengthen themselves
in preparation for the post-NRM political period. Consequently, they
fell out with the NRM leadership, and a number of them were arrested and
charged with treason. Historical NRM politicians who thought that they
were not “appropriately” placed in government, blamed this on the large
number of the “non-NRM” people in high up places, and set out to
campaign against the situation. They created a distinction between
government leaders as “NRM”, and “broad-based”. If you were referred to
as “broad-based”, it was another way of saying that you were undeserving
of your post, or that you were possibly an enemy agent (“5th
Columnist”). After some years of NRM rule, some in the leadership began
to feel that there was sufficient grassroots support for the NRM, such
that one could “off-load” the “broad–based” elements in government at no
political cost. These factors were at the centre of an unprincipled
power-struggle which was mostly covert and hence could not be resolved
democratically. It continued to play itself out outside the formal
Movement organs, with the results of weakening and eventually losing the
concept of consensus politics and broad-basedness. By the time of the
Constituent Assembly elections were held in 1994, the NRM’s all
encompassing, and broad-based concept remained only in name. For
instance, while the CA electoral law clearly stated that candidates
would stand on “individual merit”, the NRM Secretariat set up special
commercial committees at districts whose task was to recommend “NRM
candidates” for support. Not only did the logistical and administrative
machinery of NRM move against the candidates supporting or suspected to
be favouring early return to multi-party politics, it even moved against
liberal candidates advocating for the initial NRM broad–based concept.
That is why many people were surprised and confused when some senior NRM
leaders declared that “we have won!” after the CA results were
announced. Who had won? It was clear that there were two systems; one
described in the law, and another being practised. Moreover, the conduct
of the CA, again exhibited the contradictions between the principles of
NRM (and the law), and the practice. I was quite alarmed when I read a
document titled ‘Minutes Of A Meeting Between H.E The President with CA
Group Held On 25.8.94 At Kisozi.’ The copy had been availed to me by my
colleague Lt Col Serwanga Lwanga (RIP) who attended the meeting. Present
at the meeting were recorded as: H.E. the President (Chair),
Eriya Kategaya, Bidandi Ssali, Steven Chebrot, Agard Didi, George
Kanyeihamba. Miria Matembe, Mathias Ngobi, Mr Sebalu, Lt Noble Mayombo,
Jotham Tumwesigye, Aziz Kasujja, Beatrice Lagada, Faith Mwonda and
Margaret Zziwa. The introduction of the meeting reads in part as follows: The
National Political Commissar introduced this committee as a Constituent
Assembly Movement Group which wants to agree on a common position. The
arbitrary hand-picked group went ahead to take positions on major areas
of the draft constitution, which we members of CA, (considered as “NRM
supporters”), were supposed to support in the CA. It is interesting to
note that among the 16 hand-picked members of the group, only six were
directly elected to represent constituencies in the CA. The others were
presidential nominees and representatives of special interest groups.
One member was not even a CA delegate. We strongly resisted this
approach, and after intense pushing and shoving, this group was replaced
by the “Movement caucus” under the chairmanship of the National
Political Commissar, Kategaya.
Changing movement
The Movement caucus acted very much like an organ of a ruling party.
All ministers (except Paul Ssemogerere who later resigned from
government) were members. The hand-picked group, and the Movement caucus
after it, both undermined the principles of the Movement and the law.
The Constituent Assembly was negatively influenced by executive
appointments. In the middle of the CA proceedings, a cabinet reshuffle
saw Speciosa Kazibwe elevated to the vice presidency, Kintu Musoke to
premier and several other delegates appointed to ministerial posts. Many
others were appointed to be directors of parastatal companies. It is my
opinion that after these actions, some CA delegates took positions
believed to attract the favourable attention of the executive. Most CA
delegates also intended to participate in the elections that would
immediately follow the CA.
This had two negative effects:
Being aware of the previous role of the NRM Secretariat in elections,
some CA delegates would be compromised to act in such a way as to win
the support of the secretariat in the forthcoming elections. Some CA
delegates saw themselves as the first beneficiaries of the government
structure and arrangements that were being constitutionalised. So, they
took positions which would favour them, and not the common good. As a
result, the CA progressively became polarized, and its objectivity was
diminished, especially when dealing with political systems. For example,
at the commencement of the CA, every delegate made an opening statement
highlighting major views on the draft constitution. Analysis of these
statements shows that few delegates supported the immediate introduction
of multiparty system while the majority supported the continuation of
the “Movement system” for a transitional period of varying length. The
positions expressed were very much in line with the views gathered by
the Constitutional Commission. The commission noted in its report
(paragraph 0.46) that a consensus on the issue could not be attained.
This was demonstrated by the statistical analysis of views gathered from
RC 1 to RC V, plus individual and group memoranda. It will be seen that
nationally, at RC 1, “Movement” supporters were 63.2% and this
percentage decreased progressively as they went to higher RCs until
RCV (District Councils) where Movement supporters were only 38.9% and
multiparty supporters were 52.8%. Among the individual memoranda, 43.9%
supported a multiparty system, while 42.1% supported Movement. Among the
group memoranda, 45.1% supported multiparty, while 41.4% supported
Movement. It is important to note that these views were gathered at a
time when there was no impending election, and therefore, no
campaigning. Accordingly, the Constitutional Commission proposed the
following, as the only limitation on political party activities (in
Article 98 of Draft Constitution): “For the period when the Movement is
in existence, political parties shall not endorse, sponsor, offer
platform to or in anyway campaign for or against any candidate for
public office.” The CA under the influences outlined earlier ended up
with restrictions contained in the highly contentious article 269 of the
Constitution. The character of the Movement gradually changed, and the
process of change was not determined democratically. Instead, it was
continuously manipulated. Established Movement organs were continuously
undetermined, and others completely ignored. For example, the National
Executive Committee (NEC) of NRM was the organ supposed to be
coordinating change in the NRM, yet NEC had not met for more than three
years prior to the promulgation of the 1995 constitution – in spite of a
requirement for it to meet at last once every three months. Instead,
covert and arbitrarily constituted groups came in, like district
election committees, special CA groups, Movement political High Command,
Movement caucus, Maj Kakooza Mutale’s group, etc. The Movement created
by the CA and completed by Parliament (through the Movement Act 1997)
was different from the one of 1986-1995. The Movement Act 1997 created a
political organization with structures outside the governmental
structure. For the first time, the Movement was a political organization
distinct from government, the only remaining link being that it was
funded by the government. Unfortunately, instead of describing the
Movement as a political organization, the CA chose to call it a
political system – distinct from “Multiparty Political System”, and
other systems that may be thought of later. This was, in my opinion, a
grave error. We even ignored advice given to us through a letter by
President Yoweri Museveni (chairman NRM and Commander in Chief NRA) to
the CA-NRM caucus delegates, dated June 21, 1995. In the letter, the
chairman says, “the NRM is not a state but a political organization that
tries to welcome all Ugandans. It therefore cannot coerce all Ugandans
to be loyal to it. Loyalty to NRM is voluntary.” The reality of the
Movement today is that it is a political organization in much the same
way as any political party is. Having no membership cards does not make
it less so. In fact, in the letter referred to above, President Museveni
further explains: “then some people may ask the question. If NRM could
be already to compete for political office with opposing political
forces in future, why not do it now? Do not support doing it now because
it is not in the best [interest] of governance and fortunately now the
people still agree with us. It is only when the majority of the people
change that we have to adjust our position. It would be something
imposed on us by circumstances.” So the NRM/Movement system is a
convenient and, for the time, popular means to political power.
Manipulation
The characteristics which made the NRM government popular, such as
the broad- based strategy, principle of individual merit, and the
10-Point Programme have been seriously eroded. This is evidenced by the
bitter antagonism and animosity which exists between Movement supporters
in many parts of the country, e.g. Kabale, Ntungamo, Kasese and Iganga.
After more than 13 years of NRM rule, armed rebellion rages on in
northern Uganda, and has also become entrenched in the western part of
the country. All in all, when I reflect on the Movement philosophy and
governance, I can conclude that the Movement has been manipulated by
those seeking to gain or retain political power, in the same way that
political parties in Uganda were manipulated. Evidently, the results of
this manipulation are also the same, to wit: Factionalism, loss of faith
in the system, corruption, insecurity and abuse of human rights,
economic distortions and eventually decline. So, whether it’s political
parties or Movement, the real problem is dishonest, opportunistic and
undemocratic leadership operating in a weak institutional framework and a
weak civil society which cannot control them. I have shown that over
the years the “Movement System” has been defined in the law in a certain
way, but the leaders have chosen to act in a difficult way. This is
dishonest and opportunistic leadership. I have also shown how changes
have been made to the Movement agenda, and other important decisions
have been made outside the Movement structures. This too is undemocratic
leadership. In my opinion, the way forward in developing a stable
political situation is to do the following: Urgently revisit the legal
framework with a view to making an equitable law and regulation for all
political organizations. The Movement should be treated as a political
organization. Implementing this would need amendments to the
Constitution, including amendment of articles 69 and 74. This requires
the approval of the people through a referendum and the forthcoming
referendum could be used for this purpose. In any case, laws are a
reflection of the political will, so if there is political will to
correct a situation, finding a way is easy. The primary guarantor of
democracy, human rights and the rule of law must be the civil society.
Its capacity should, therefore, be quickly developed. Focus on a
programme that could quickly raise the standards of living of our people
to a decent level. This is an essential antecedent for our society to
build a viable democracy. Of course, the approach to raising the
standards of living is highly debatable. I have personal views that I
hope to share with the public at another time. I pray to the almighty
God to guide us so that we do not tumble again. Next week;
Besigye announces that he would contest for the presidency in October
2000. You can’t miss the drama this announcement caused. |
mcmubs@observer.ug This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it |
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